Medieval Christianity assumed the existence of three types of laws: divine law, natural law, and artificial law. [4] Theologians have discussed at length the scope of natural law, with the Enlightenment promoting a greater use of reason and expanding the scope of natural law and marginalizing divine law in a process of secularization. [9] Since the authority of divine law is rooted in its source, the origins and history of divine law are important. [10] [a] The natural law is «the participation of the rational creature in the eternal law» (ST. I-II, Q. 91, A. 2.). The highest standard of human life is the divine, eternal, objective and universal law that God governs us according to His wisdom and love. God makes man a partaker of his law, that man may know the unchanging truth» (DH 3) [7]. Natural law «depends on God`s desire for and submission to Him, and on the feeling that the other is equal to the one» (CCC 1955). Moreover, divine law comes only from God, while natural law is a set of intrinsic values in man. It is «natural» because it consists of the reason given to us by the «higher reason» of the divine legislator.
[8] They are natural because they are objective principles that have their origin in human nature (GS 16; DH 14). [9] Natural law is universal because it embraces every human being, every epoch (cf. CCC 1956): «It is immutable and constant throughout history; the rules that express it remain essentially valid» (CCC, 1958). Divorce without fault on his part, on the other hand, does not violate natural law. It is common in many cultures for a man to get rid of his wife for no great reason; He just has to be willing to endure the antipathy of his wife`s family. However, divorce for a reason other than adultery appears to be contrary to divine law. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus says that although Jewish law allowed simple divorce, he is still evil except in cases of adultery («sexual impurity,» actually, if I remember correctly, but that would at least include adultery). From the point of view of natural law, including what a reasonable and intelligent person would think after careful consideration, this wickedness is not obvious. It seems that if a husband beats his wife out of sheer desire to cause pain, refuses to support her and threatens to kill the children, then she has reason to divorce.
But Jesus forbids it; She may be able to leave him indefinitely and perhaps get a civil divorce, but she can`t annul the marriage and marry someone else instead. Even if the robot does not attain the dignity of an agent, it could still be considered a method of placing orders. Let`s say I write a macro for my computer that dials Amazon every week, randomly selects a book, and has it delivered to my mother-in-law by entering my credit card number. Certainly, I am legally bound by this transaction. My robot is smarter, but it`s still a machine that I`ve given the ability to transact with what is legally my money. Let`s look at a few examples of each and end with a discussion of how God`s positive law is added to natural law. But there is another type of theory of natural law that has to do with the relationship between morality and law. According to natural law theory, there is no clear separation between the concept of law and the concept of morality.
Although there are different versions of the theory of natural law, they all subscribe to the thesis that there are at least some laws that depend for their «authority» not on a pre-existing human convention, but on the logical relationship in which they stand with moral norms. Otherwise, some norms are authoritative because of their moral content, even though there is no convention that makes moral merit a criterion of legal validity. The idea that the concepts of law and morality overlap in some way is called the overlap thesis. In Catholic understanding, there is a divine law and a law of nature. From my reading, it seems that divine law = revelation (as a Protestant would call it) and natural law = what could be deduced from good and evil by simply using reason to extrapolate the consequences of the act. There are some problems with this objection. First, conceptual naturalism does not exclude criticism of the norms that are applied by a society as law. To the extent that it can plausibly be asserted that the content of a norm imposed by society as a law does not correspond to natural law, this is a legitimate reason for moral criticism: since the norm to be applied by the law is unjust, it follows from conceptual naturalism that it is not legally valid.
Thus, the state commits an injustice by applying this norm against individuals. Although the content of the Decalogue thus corresponds to both natural and divine law, its explicit proclamation by Moses at God`s command was not without advantages. The great moral code, the foundation of all true civilization, has thus become the clear, secure and publicly recognized standard of moral conduct for the Jewish people and, through them, for Christianity. The important things that [conceptual naturalism] is supposed to allow us (e.g., evaluate the law morally and determine our moral obligations in relation to the law) are actually complicated by breaking the distinction between morality and law. If we really want to look at law from a moral point of view, it can obscure the task if we consider that law and morality are essentially linked. Moral criticism and legal reform may be supported by initial moral skepticism of the law. Divine law and natural law are ancient concepts that date back to the Middle Ages. The main difference between divine law and natural law is that divine law comes directly from God, while natural law is inherent in man.
A more reasonable interpretation of statements such as «an unjust law is not a law at all» is that unjust laws are not laws «in the fullest sense of the word.» As one might say of a professional who had the necessary degrees and credentials, but still did not seem to have the necessary skills or judgment: «She is not a lawyer» or «he is not a doctor.» It only suggests that we don`t think the title has all the implications it normally has in this case. Similarly, to assert that an unjust law is «not really a law» can only mean that it does not have the same moral force or offer the same grounds of action as laws compatible with the «higher right» (Bix 1996, 226). The way God has regulated His worship in the worship of the temple of the Old Covenant (dietary laws, sacrifices, priests, ceremonial festivals, etc.) is different from the way He now regulates it in the New Covenant, but the principle remains that «the acceptable way of worshipping the true God is instituted by Himself and therefore limited to His own revealed will. that he is not to be worshipped according to the ideas and powers of men or the propositions of Satan, under visible representations, or in any other manner not prescribed in the Scriptures (Ex 20:4-6; Deuteronomy 4:15–20; 12:32; Matthew 4:9–10; 15:9; Acts 17:25; Colossians 2:23). While the purpose for which God commanded the ceremonial law of the Old Covenant is fulfilled and is no longer binding (Dan.