Supreme Court Case Tinker V Des Moines Summary

The students` families challenged the suspensions in federal court on First Amendment grounds. A federal district judge dismissed the lawsuit in 1966, finding that the school rule was a reasonable way to prevent students from disturbing. The Eighth District Court of Appeals split evenly, allowing for the lower court`s decision. The students then appealed to the Supreme Court and won in a 7-2 decision. The Tinker case remains an important step in defending the right of students in schools to express their opinions in a peaceful and orderly manner. the constitutionality of the actions of school authorities on the grounds that it is reasonable to prevent disturbances in school discipline. 258 F. Supp. 971 (1966). The court referred to the decision of the Fifth Judicial District in a similar case, but expressly refused to follow it that the wearing of symbols such as armbands can only be prohibited if it «materially and substantially compromises the requirements of reasonable discipline in the operation of the school.» Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966).

[Note 1] «The Vietnam War and U.S. involvement in it have been the subject of great controversy for some time. When the bracelet ordinance it contained was enacted, the debate over the Vietnam War had become fierce in many places. An anti-war protest march was recently held in Washington, D.C. A wave of incidents with conscription card fires protesting the war had swept the country. At that time, two high-profile cases were pending before this court in which cards had been burned. Those who supported the war and those who opposed it expressed their views vehemently. The issue in this case is not the regulation of skirt length or type of clothing, students` freedom of expression and the symbolic right to express oneself in school are the subject of the seminal case of Tinker v.

Monks of the Supreme Court. Addressing Rutgers students, Mary Beth Tinker said, «Maybe I could talk to these kids about this case and my experience of speaking out, and then I could encourage them to speak out because young people are so powerful when they stand up for themselves.» The issue raised in this case does not concern the regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, headgear or representation. These are not aggressive and disruptive actions or even group protests. Our problem is with the direct, primal First Amendment rights that resemble «pure speech.» In Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.C. S.C.

1967), District Judge Hemphill was confronted with a case in which 300 students gathered on campus to express their views on school practices. He stressed that a school is not like a hospital or a prison. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 and p. 536 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. p. 39 (1966). It is a public place and its dedication to certain uses does not mean that the constitutional rights of persons entitled to reside there should be judged as if it were purely private property. See Edwards v.

South Carolina, 372 and 229 (1963); Braun v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 (1966). The principle of these cases is not limited to the supervised and orderly discussion that takes place in class. The main objective to which schools are dedicated is to welcome students during the prescribed hours for certain types of activities. These activities include face-to-face communication between students. [Note 6] It`s not just an inevitable part of going to school; It is also an important part of the educational process. A student`s rights therefore do not only include lessons. While in the cafeteria, on the field, or on petitioners, three students at a public school in Des Moines, Iowa, were suspended from school for wearing black armbands to protest government policies in Vietnam. They sought symbolic damages and an injunction against a settlement issued by the defendants prohibiting the wearing of armbands. The District Court dismissed the action on the grounds that the regulation fell within the competence of the Committee, although no significant interference with the conduct of school activities was found.

The Court of Appeal, which sat in a bench, was upheld by an equally divided court. v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.C.S.C. 1967) (protest meeting ordered on the State College campus); Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 613 (D.C.M.D. Ala.

967) (expulsion of student editor of university newspaper). In the circumstances of this case, the prohibition of the «silent and passive witness of armbands», as one of the children called it, is no less contrary to the guarantees of the Constitution. refused to obey a school order that would give students who wanted to learn the opportunity to do so. You don`t have to be a prophet or the son of a prophet to know that as a result of today`s court decision, some students in Iowa schools — and indeed in all schools — will be ready, able, and willing to challenge their teachers at virtually any command. This is all the more unfortunate for schools, as groups of students across the country are already running free, carrying out burglaries, sit-ins, lies and burglaries. Many of these student groups, as anyone who reads the newspapers and watches the news on television knows all too well, have already committed riots, confiscation of property and destruction. They set up pickets in schools to force students not to cross their picket lines and too often violently attacked serious but frightened students who wanted an education the pickets did not want. Students involved in such activities are apparently convinced that they know much more about how public school systems work than their parents, teachers and elected school officials. It is not an answer to say that the individual students here have not yet reached such high points in their requests to attend classes in order to exert political pressure.

Unleashed with claims for damages and injunctions against their teachers as they are here, it is nothing but wishful thinking to imagine that immature young students will not soon believe that it is their right to control schools, and not the right of tax-paying states to hire teachers for the benefit of students. This case, which in my view has no constitutional basis, therefore subjects all public schools in the country to the whims and whims of their loudest students, but perhaps not their smartest students. I, for one, am not entirely convinced that the students are smart enough, even with the expert help of this Washington court, to run the 23,390 public schools. The court ruled that the First Amendment applied to public schools and that school officials could not censor student speech unless it interfered with the educational process. Since wearing a black armband was not disturbing, the court held that the First Amendment protected students` right to wear it. Learn more about students` right to freedom of expression The Court`s decision in this case ushers in what I believe to be an entirely new era in which the power to control students through «elected representatives of state-sponsored public schools.» in the United States is transferred with final effect to the Supreme Court. [Note 1] In the circumstances of this case, the prohibition of the «silent and passive witness of armbands», as one of the children called it, is no less contrary to the guarantees of the Constitution. The district court recognized that wearing an armband for the purpose of expressing certain opinions is the type of symbolic act that falls under the First Amendment`s free speech clause. See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U., p. 624 (1943); Stromberg v.

California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931). See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U., p. 88 (1940); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); Braun v. Louisiana, 383 U. S.

131 (1966). As we shall see, the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was completely detached from the actual or potentially disruptive behaviour on the part of those involved. While I agree with much of what is said in the Court`s opinion and its judgment in this case, I rely on the following reasons to declare the judgment of the Des Moines and the two subsequent courts unconstitutional. First, the Court concluded that wearing armbands was «symbolic speech» that «resembled pure speech» and was therefore protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, the Court held that public schools were an appropriate place to engage in «symbolic speech» as long as the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was completely separate from the actual or potentially disruptive conduct of the parties involved. It was closely related to «pure speech,» which, as we have repeatedly stated, is entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment. The majority affirmed that the First Amendment protects children`s speech and expression in public schools, meaning that any policy that restricts free speech must be justified on constitutional grounds. Although a school board receives some reverence from the courts, it must be able to cite something more than discomfort, clumsiness or inconvenience as the basis for limiting speech. The fear that outside speech or behaviour would interfere with school discipline is an example of justification that would likely convince a court to maintain policies rationally related to this concern.